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The Rebirth of Morrissey:
Towards a Coherent Theory of Due Process
for Prisoners and Parolees
SHARIF A. JACOB*
INTRODUCTION
Prisoners occupy the least favored rungs of society. Although
prisoners were once thought of as slaves,' courts begrudgingly came to
recognize that the Constitution provides some measure of protection to
prisoners.' In 1972, the Supreme Court issued Morrissey v. Brewer,3 a
landmark decision that expanded due process protections for prisoners
and outlined a coherent standard by which due process claims could be
adjudicated. Whenever the state condemned an inmate "to suffer
grievous loss," the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the prisoner
procedural protections However, over the next two decades, the
Supreme Court retreated from this standard of due process,
circumscribing the protections afforded by Morrissey.5
This Note demonstrates that more recent decisions of the Supreme
Court have breathed new life into the due process standard used by
Morrissey. Part I explores the due process landscape in the years leading
up to Morrissey and the subsequent decisions that whittled away at
Morrissey's foundations. Part II argues that recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence has revived the theory of due process Morrissey enshrined.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007; B.A., Yale
University, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Rory Little for his close review and excellent critique;
my partner, Anas, for his support and patience; and the staff of Hastings Law Journal for their hard
work.
i. Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in
Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REv. 1229, t229 (1998). A cursory review of the footnotes in this Note revelas that
it is a strong tribute to Professor Herman. Although we ultimately reach different conclusions on my
central thesis, see infra note 136, this Note extends ideas Professor Herman previously propounded.
2. See Herman, supra note 1, at 1239-45.
3. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
4. Id. at 481-82 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, I68
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See Thomas J. Bamonte, The Viability of Morrissey v. Brewer and the Due Process Rights of
Parolees and Other Conditional Releasees, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 138-5o (993).
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Part III describes the consequences of the Court's revised theory of due
process.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF MORRISSEY
The common law is often thought of as directional, continuing to
evolve towards some end goal.6 However, prisoner due process
jurisprudence in the decades before and after Morrissey reveals a
common law that ebbs and flows. Before Morrissey, a right/privilege
binary governed prisoner due process. This theory located protected
interests by examining the scope of state power. Morrissey submerged
this theory, advancing a replacement that located interests protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment in the liberty residing with the individual.
However, as Morrissey's theoretical basis receded, the right/privilege
binary resurfaced, altered at its fringes but not at its core.
A. THE RIGHT/PRIVILEGE THEORY OF LIBERTY
The right/privilege theory of constitutional law surprises the
newcomer with its simplicity. According to this theory, the Due Process
Clause protects liberty interests so long as they are rights.7 However, the
clause affords no protection to privileges.8
Perhaps because of its simplicity, the right/privilege theory has
demonstrated an amazing resilience in the face of criticism.' Over ioo
years ago, Justice Holmes memorialized the theory in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford." In McAuliffe, a former police officer asked the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to reinstate him after the
mayor fired him for political activities." Writing for the majority, Holmes
rejected this request, explaining that "[t]he petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman." 2 Because the state employed the petitioner as an act of
grace, he could not invoke the First Amendment as protection against
termination of his employment.
The right/privilege theory soon caught fire in the Supreme Court.
For almost a century, the Court used this theory to justify denial of due
process to a wide variety of interests. In 1954, the Court held that the
6. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40-,50 (1921). "[A]s a
system of case law develops ... great and shining truths will ultimately be shaped. The accidental and
transitory will yield the essential and permanent." Id. at 35.
7. Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and
Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 487 (1984).
8. Id.
9. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (i97o); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1439-41, 1459-60 (1968).
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Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a state from revoking a
doctor's license on the grounds that he had been convicted of failing to
provide documents to the Committee on Un-American Activities.'3 The
reason: the practice of medicine is merely a privilege.'4 Two years later,
the Court denied a member of the Communist Party a hearing to
challenge his deportation on the grounds that relief from deportation was
not a right. 5 In the prisoner's rights context, the Due Process Clause did
not require a hearing before the government revoked a convict's status
as a probationer and returned him to prison." The convict held his status
as a probationer merely by the grace of the state.'
7
Nonetheless, shortly after mid-century, the right/privilege theory fell
into decline. 8 The doctrine was criticized as ipse dixit." Furthermore,
courts relied on various other doctrines to limit the effect of the
right/privilege theory." These doctrines allowed the Supreme Court to
invoke the Constitution to provide some sort of protection for a privilege
without converting it into a right.' By 1970, the Court rejected the
right/privilege theory as a rationale for denying protection to property
under the Due Process Clause.22 A "constitutional challenge [could no
longer] be answered by an argument that [the interest at stake is] a
privilege and not a right."23
B. MORRISSEY ANNOUNCES A NATURAL RIGHTS THEORY OF LIBERTY
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of protection
due to prisoners under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected
an approach that looks for the source of liberty in the grace of the state.
Instead, it proffered a new theory that located liberty within the
collection of natural rights every person possesses.
Morrissey tells the story of two petty criminals. Morrissey was
13. Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,443-44 (1954).
14. Id. at 45 1.
I5. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345,354 (1956).
16. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490,491-93 (i935).
17. Id. at 492-93.
18. Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1442, 1445-58.
x9. Id. at 1459-6o.
20. Id. at 1458. Van Alstyne describes two doctrines-the unconstitutional conditions and indirect
effects doctrines-and three constitutional provisions-procedural due process, equal protection, and
the prohibition on bills of attainder-that the Supreme Court used to "circumvent the harsh
consequences" of the right/privilege doctrine without repudiating it entirely. Id. at 1445-58. For
example, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents the government from indirectly infringing
on a constitutional right by taking away a privilege to punish the person who exercised that right. Id. at
1445-46. When properly invoked, this doctrine prevents the government from disturbing an
individual's privilege. id. at 1446. Nonetheless, it does not require that the individual's privilege be
reclassified as a right. Id.
21. See id. at 1445.
22. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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convicted of attempting to circulate false checks.' Booher was convicted
of forgery.25 As was then routine, both men were paroled. Then, without
holding a hearing beforehand, the State of Iowa revoked the parole of
both men and returned them to prisons ioo miles or more from their
homes." In support of its decision, Iowa relied on parole officers' reports
alleging that Morrissey and Booher had enaged in minor, albeit
multiple, violations of their conditions of parole.'
Both petitioned for habeas corpus arguing that they had been denied
due process because the State had returned them to prison without
providing hearings. 9 The district court denied the petitions3' and the
Eight Circuit affirmed.3' In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice
Burger, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that due process accompany
termination of parole.32
The Court's method of analysis in Morrissey proves just as important
as its holding. Chief Justice Burger quickly disposed of the right/privilege
theory.33 Instead, his opinion laid out a new, two-step analysis. First, the
Court asked whether the interest at issue constituted a liberty within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4 If so, the Court would then
determine what process was due.35
i. The Nature and Weight of the Liberty Interest
Morrissey's innovation lies in its answer to the first question. The
Court focused on the nature and the weight of the interest:,6 The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process to those who the state
24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972).
25. Id. at 473.
26. Id. at 472-73. Parole is "[tihe release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full sentence
has been served." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1149 (8th ed. 2004). Many jurisdictions, including the
federal government, have since abolished parole. HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 221 (8th ed. 2003).
27. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472-73.
28. Id. at 473-74. Morrissey allegedly purchased a car under a false name, operated it without
permission, lied to the police about his insurance and address when he got into a car accident, used a
false name to obtain credit, and failed to report his home address to his parole officer. Id. at 473.
Booher used a false name to get a drivers license, drove a car without permission, left the area without
permission, and failed to hold a job. Id. at 474.
29. Id. at 474.
30. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942,943 (8th Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 952.
32. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472, 482,490.
33. Id. at 481 ("[Tihis Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a right or a privilege." (quoting Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,374 (97) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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"'condemn[s] to suffer grievous loss."'37 The Court then examined a
hypothetical parolee's interests by focusing on the liberties the parolee
retained by virtue of his conditional release from prison." The parolee
"can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and
to form the other enduring attachments of normal life."39 Re-
imprisonment would terminate all these liberty interests. Furthermore,
upon revocation, the prisoner may face a lengthy term of imprisonment.4'
The Court reasoned that all these liberty interests lay at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 To revoke them would inflict a grievous loss
on the parolee.'
The Court also sketched a tripartite taxonomy of individuals for use
in prisoner due process analysis.43 This taxonomy classifies individuals
according to the residuum of liberty they retain by virtue of their status
in the criminal justice system. At the top of this taxonomy lie those who
have never been convicted of a crime. They retain a wide range of
liberties.' At the bottom lie those to whom the state justifiably denies
substantial liberties by virtue of their conviction and sentence of
imprisonment.45 Even though imprisonment may constitute a grievous
loss, the fair and complete process that leads to the conviction allows the
state to inflict this loss. 6 The parolee lies in between the individual who
has never been convicted and the prisoner.47 The "[sitate properly
subjects .the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other
citizens." Nonetheless, upon release, the parolee regains many of the
liberties held by those without a conviction.49
The Court no longer looked to the powers of the state to determine
whether the liberty interest fell within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, it looked to the liberty held by the parolees. The
Court espoused a theory in which all people start with some amount of
37. Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (i95i)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court previously applied the grievous loss analysis to determine to
what extent procedural due process protections must accompany the withdrawal of welfare benefits.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
38. Morrissey, 4o8 U.S. at 481-82.




43. See Bamonte, supra note 5, at 130.
44. See Morrissey, 4o8 U.S. at 482.
45. See id.
46. Although it only hinted at this common sense rationale in Morrissey, the Supreme Court later
explained that "given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of
his liberty to the extent that the [sitate may confine him." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).





liberty. The state may constitutionally withdraw some of that liberty by
virtue of the judicial process leading to a conviction. However, the mere
fact of a conviction does not extinguish all liberty held by a parolee.
2. Balancing the State's Interests Against the Prisoner's Interests to
Determine What Process Is Due
The Court then moved to the question of what process was due."
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."5' The Court considered three distinct
factors that modem students of due process recognize as the Mathews
factors: the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the
government's interest. 2 The Court had already explored the parolee's
interest and did not repeat this analysis. Turning to the risk of erroneous
deprivation, the Court reasoned that procedures were needed to make
the factual determination that the parolee actually violated the
conditions of parole.53 The parolee's conviction did give the state an
"overwhelming interest" in returning parole violators to prison without
the burden of having to prosecute a full blown criminal trial.' But,
society's interest in the rehabilitation of the parolee balanced the scales
in favor of some procedural guarantees.5
This balancing led the Court to conclude that the Due Process
Clause guaranteed the parolee two hearings before revoking his parole. 6
At a preliminary hearing, held promptly after re-arrest, the state would
establish that probable caused existed to believe that the parolee had
violated his conditions of parole. 7 At a later revocation hearing, the
parolee would have a chance to show that he did not violate his
conditions of parole or, if he did, that mitigating circumstances
demonstrated that revocation was unwarranted."
50. Id. at 483.
51. Id. at 481.
52. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976), with Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483-85.
53. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483-84.
54. Id. at 483.
55. Id. at 484.
56. Id. at 485-90.
57. Id. at 485. At the preliminary hearing, the "minimum requirements of due process" include:
(i) a decision maker uninvolved in the decision to charge or arrest the parolee; (2) "notice that the
hearing will take place"; (3) an opportunity for the parolee to appear, speak on his own behalf, and
present evidence, including witnesses; and (4) a statement by the decision maker of the reasons for his
decision and the evidence relied upon. Id. at 485-87, 489.
58. Id. at 488. At a minimum, due process requires that the parole revocation hearing include: (I)
"written notice of the claimed violations of parole"; (2) disclosure to the parolee of the claimed
violations of parole; (3) "opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence"; (4) "the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)"; (5) "a 'neutral and detached' hearing
body such as a traditional parole board"; and (6) "a written statement by fact-finders as to the
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole." Id. at 489.
[Vol. 57:1213
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The decision in Morrissey held the potential to radically alter the
landscape of prisoner due process jurisprudence. Not only did a
conviction fail to fully extinguish the liberty interests of the convicted,
but these interests were weighty enough to demand significant
procedural protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore,
Morrissey provided a coherent theory that could both recognize various
types of liberty interests and turn away those that were not weighty
enough. However, almost immediately, the same Court that issued
Morrissey began to dismantle it.
C. A RETURN TO THE DISCARDED RIGHT/PRIVILEGE BINARY
In the years after Morrissey, the Supreme Court issued a series of
cases explaining the process due to prisoners under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 With few exceptions, these cases chipped away at the
theoretical underpinnings of Morrissey. The Court slowly replaced
Morrissey's natural rights theory with the old right/privilege binary
dressed in different vocabulary.6 By 1993, these cases so undermined
Morrissey's theoretical basis6! that at least one commentator predicted
the Court would overrule it.
6
i. WOLFF V. McDONNELL Laid the Foundation for
MORRISSEY'S Undoing
Standing alone, Wolff v. McDonnell, the first major case after
Morrissey to examine the due process of prisoners, did little to
undermine the natural rights theory. But a contagion in its analysis
infected a stream of cases to follow."3 In Wolff, Nebraska state yrisoners
sued arguing that they had been deprived of good-time credits 4 without
the process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6' A Nebraska
statute provided that inmates could forfeit their good-time credit by
engaging in "flagrant and serious misconduct." 66 The Court held that
59. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (i99o); Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454
(1989); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Hewitt
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (i98o); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. i (i979); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (i974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
60. Of course, the Court never explicitly reclaimed the right/privilege binary. Nonetheless,
commentators and dissenters alike noted the resemblance of the Court's new theory to the discarded
binary. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 354
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bamonte, supra note 5, at 142; Herman, supra note 7, at 575.
61. Herman, supra note 7, at 506.
62. Bamonte, supra note 5, at 156.
63. See Herman, supra note 7, at 506.
64. Good-time credits represent reductions in the prison term that prisoners could earn for good
behavior in prison. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 553.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 546.
June 2006
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Nebraska's procedures for revoking the good-time credits failed to
provide the process due under the Fourteenth Amendment.
67
This holding is entirely consistent with Morrissey. Furthermore,
some of the Court's analysis affirmed and perhaps even extended
Morrissey's theoretical underpinnings. Wolff invoked Morrissey's
tripartite taxonomy to conclude that even prisoners retain some measure
of liberty under the Due Process Clause.68 Like Morrissey, Wolff
balanced the state's interest in revoking the credits against the
individual's interest in retaining them to determine what level of process
was due.
9
However, during the first step of the due process analysis, which
determines whether the interest at issue constitutes a liberty, the Court
did not apply the grievous loss analysis set forth in Morrissey.° Instead, it
noted that "the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit
for satisfactory behavior while in prison."'" Nonetheless, because the
Nebraska statute provided that good-time credit could only be revoked
for serious misconduct, "[tihe [s]tate itself ... provided a statutory right
to good[-]time" credits.7" The Court opined that the "liberty itself [was] a
statutory creation of the [s]tate."'73 Because the state had created this
right, and the right had "real substance," it constituted a liberty interest74
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.75
This mode of analysis departs significantly from that of Morrissey.
The Court in Wolff could have simply concluded that when a state
imprisons an inmate for a period longer than the term he would have
served with the good-time credits, it inflicts a grievous loss because it
denies the prisoner the same liberty interests described in Morrissey.
While a loss of good-time credits might burden a prisoner less than
67. Id. at 560.
68. Id. at 555-56.
69. Id. at 560-63.
70. In fact, the Court suggested that the denial of good-time credit, being qualitatively different
from the revocation of parole, might not inflict a grievous loss. See id. at 56o-61.
71. Id. at 557.
72. Id. at 558.
73. Id.
74. The Court has used the words "right." "state-created right," "interest," "liberty," and "liberty
interest" to refer to the same concept: a liberty, the state's deprivation of which must be accompanied
by Fourteenth Amendment due process. Compare Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. I, 7 (1979), and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1976), with Wolff, 48
U.S. at 556-58. This interchangeable terminology emphasizes the Court's return to the right/privilege
binary. However, it can also lead to confusion. The right to due process itself hails from the
Fourteenth Amendment. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (198o). Furthermore, once the Court
locates a liberty interest, the Fourteenth Amendment, not state law, determines what procedural
protections are due. Id. at 491. In order to avoid confusion between state-created rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, this Note refers to liberties whose deprivation requires
procedural protections as "liberty interests" (except where direct quotation otherwise requires).
75. Wolff, 48 U.S. at 557.
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returning to prison after being paroled, this difference could be
accommodated by offering less process (assuming the state's interest in
removing good-time credits as discipline is weighty). Under this
alternative, the Morrissey-based analysis would not require a diversion
into state-created liberty interests, a diversion that revives the possibility
that states could convert these interests into privileges undeserving of
due process.
In defense of Wolff, perhaps the Court was merely trying to make
clear that it was not ruling that the Constitution requires states to offer
good-time credits to prisoners. 6 The Court may have been reaching for
language to convey the notion that when a state threatens to take away
good-time credits, it is irrelevant to the due process analysis that the
Constitution does not require the state to offer those credits in the first
place. If so, the language claiming that state law created a liberty interest
might be regarded as less than precise dicta.
2. MEACHUM v. FANO Gives Teeth to the Doctrine of State-Created
Liberty Interests
Years later, Meachum v. Fano belied such a reading. In Meachum,
inmates sued alleging that they had been denied due process when they
were transferred to prisons with less favorable living conditions." The
Court held that no process is due to an inmate being transferred from
one prison to another because the transfer does not infringe any liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.,
8
Again, the Court could have easily reached this conclusion under the
Morrissey framework. Using the tripartite taxonomy, under which duly
convicted prisoners retain the least residual liberty, the Court could have
concluded that a transfer does not inflict a grievous loss.79 Because the
weight of the loss would not rise to constitutional proportions, the
Fourteenth Amendment would offer no protection.
Instead, the Court began by shambling unsteadily down the path laid
by Morrissey. The Court purported to reject the grievous loss analysis. 8°
However, it then considered the severity of the loss (the heart of the
grievous loss analysis) to an individual with a valid conviction. Invoking
the tripartite taxonomy, the Court noted that an inmate's conviction
allowed the state to deprive prisoners of significant liberty.8' The state
could constitutionally transfer the inmate to another prison with less
76. Similarly, the U.S. Constitution does not require any state to parole prisoners. See Greenholtz,
442 U.S. at 7; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-I1 (1976). Nonetheless, the Court in Morrissey did not
find it necessary to so conclude.
77. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 222.
78. Id. at 223-24.
79. Id. at 229-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




favorable conditions."' The opinion should have ended there.
However, the analysis then proceeded, unnecessarily, .down a
different and tortured path. The Court explained that liberty interests
had two sources: the Constitution and state law. 83 The Due Process
Clause itself does not create a liberty interest in remaining in one prison
over another. 84 Neither does state law. 85 Unlike Wolff, the statute at issue
in Meachum did not condition transfer from one prison to another on
any triggering event.8 As evidence, the decision set forth the
Massachusetts statute, which authorized transfers without listing any
specific conditions under which transfer must (or must not) take place.
Because the state law failed to list any conditions, it did not endow
prisoners with a liberty interest against transfer to another prison.
Instead, the state housed its inmates in better (or worse) prisons as an act
of grace. Remaining in a prison with better conditions amounts to
nothing more than a privilege the state chose to endow.
With this analysis, Meachum created a fork in the road. Courts had
the option to follow a path that originated with Morrissey; or courts
could attempt to determine whether the Constitution and/or state laws
created a liberty interest. Under Meachum, only if a court could locate
such a government-created liberty interest would the Fourteenth
Amendment offer due process.
3. The State-Created Liberty Interest Theory Takes on a
Life of its Own
Soon, the Court chose the second path. It issued case after case in
which the hunt for federal and state-created liberty interests dominated
its analysis."' Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correction
Complex illustrates the use of this mode of analysis at its apex. In
Greenholtz, prisoners alleged that Nebraska failed to afford them due
process before denying them parole." The Court firmly rejected the
weight of the interest as a factor in determining whether the interest
82. Id.
83. Id. at 226.
84. Id. at 225.
85. Id. at 226.
86. Id. at 226-27.
87. Id. at 227 n.7.
88. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (199o) (constitutional and state-created
conditional right to decline antipsychotic medication); Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
460, 465 (1989) (no right to visitation); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (state-
created right to parole); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-5i (1983) (no right preventing
transfer to an out-of-state prison): Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1983) (state-created right to
reside in general prison population); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 48o, 492-93 (198o) (constitutional and
state-created right preventing involuntary transfer to psychiatric facility); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979) (state-created right to parole).
89. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 3-4.
[Vol. 57:I12131222
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constituted a liberty under the Due Process Clause.' The Court held that
"[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence."9' The
Court reasoned that once the prisoner had been duly convicted, "'the
criminal defendant [had] been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.' 92
Furthermore, while a state may create a parole system, the Constitution
does not require it to do so.93
Nonetheless, the Court did locate a state-created liberty interest in
parole.' Scouring the Nebraska statute governing parole, the Court
found the following syntax: the parole board shall release the prisoner on
parole unless certain conditions were met.95 This magical syntax created a
liberty interest in parole that could not be denied without adequate
procedural due process protections.9
The theory of liberty applied by Greenholtz unsettles the very
foundations of a natural rights theory of liberty.' Language in
Greenholtz suggests that a conviction deprives a prisoner of all liberty.
98
Instead of liberty residing naturally within all individuals, liberty
becomes a creation of the Constitution and the states. For this reason,
the weight of the interest does not determine whether the interest merits
due process. Instead, the first inquiry must be whether the state has
created the liberty.
Not only does this theory free Fourteenth Amendment liberty from
its textual context,' it provides a perverse incentive to the states. ' The
state-created theory of liberty allows state legislators to decide whether
or not to create a liberty interest in parole, prison transfers, and other
interests that prisoners might claim. If a state wants to maximize its
discretion in these areas, it removes the magical mandatory syntax from
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id. at i i.
96. See id. at II-12. Although the Court in Greenholtz was not crystal clear about its logic on this
point, later cases confirmed that mandatory language in a state statute requiring that some action be
taken unless certain conditions were met gave rise to a state-created right to due process in connection
with that action. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
470-72 (1983). The Supreme Court also confirmed that the magic lies in the syntax, not the specific
words. Allen, 482 U.S. at 378 ("We reject the argument that a statute that mandates release 'unless'
certain findings are made is different from a statute that mandates release 'if,' 'when,' or 'subject to'
such findings being made. Any such statute 'creates a presumption that parole release will be
granted."' (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 n.io)).
97. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 ("The conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has
extinguished that liberty right.").
99. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § i.
ioo. See Bamonte, supra note 5, at 151 n.147; Herman, supra note 7, at 528.
June 2006
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
its statutes. States quickly took notice of this new power.'"' State
legislators amended penal statutes, substituting permissive for mandatory
language.' 2
Even worse, the Supreme Court suggested that notwithstanding
mandatory language in a statute, state supreme courts could interpret the
liberty interest out of existence."° As if on cue, state supreme courts held
that their statutes did not create any constitutionally protected liberty
interests." 4 Thus, mandatory language in one state could give rise to a
protected liberty interest, whereas the same mandatory language in
another state would not. 5
State legislators responded rationally to the incentives created by the
Court's return to the right/privilege binary. States create these statutes in
an attempt to provide objective criteria to guide executive branch
personnel who implement important decisions such as parole revocation.
Thus, in a sense, states that attempt to bring some uniformity to prison
management decisions are punished with constitutionally imposed
notice, hearings, and other procedures. States that do not provide
mandatory, objective criteria avoid these costly procedures.
Because the Court had removed weight from its analysis, a prisoner
could sue for the loss of any trifling interest the state denied the prisoner
without procedural protections.' Regardless of the weight of the
interest, the Fourteenth Amendment would provide some measure of
protection as long as the states used the magic syntax in statutes that
created that interest. For example, one district court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a prisoner due process before he
could be given a sack lunch instead of lunch on a tray."'° Of course, the
inverse would also be true. Unless the Constitution creates a liberty
interest, a weighty interest would have no protection unless the state
elevated that interest from a privilege to a liberty interest.
Ioi. See ABADINSKY, supra note 26, at 251 fig.8.6 ("It is not the intention of the Board to create a
'liberty interest' of the type described in [Greenholtz].").
102. See, e.g., Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1418 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (parole).
IO3. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (983); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (noting that the
Court was deprived of Nebraska's interpretation of the parole statute and citing Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341, 345 (1976)). In Bishop, the Supreme Court declined to scrutinize a federal district judge's
interpretation of a state employment law because of the judge's experience with North Carolina law.
426 U.S. at 345-46.
io4. E.g. Lono v. Ariyoshi, 621 P.2d 976, 981 (Haw. 1981).
1O5 . Compare Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982-83 (E.D. Cal. 2005)
(mandatory language in California parole statute does not give rise to liberty interest), with Allen, 482
U.S. at 376-78 (almost identical mandatory language in Montana parole statute does give rise to
liberty interest).
io6. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472.483 (1995) (citing cases).
107. Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 734-35 (8th Cir. I99o) (reversing the district court).
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II. THE REBIRTH OF MORRISSEY
These drawbacks were not lost on the Supreme Court. A series of
cases presented an opportunity to remedy these problems. Slowly, the
Court picked up the threads of Morrissey. By the turn of the twenty-first
century, Morrissey's analysis once again dominated prisoner due process
jurisprudence.
A. VITEK V. JONES REFUSES TO FORSAKE A DUE PROCESS THEORY
GROUNDED IN WEIGHT
The first cracks in the revived right/privilege theory appeared in
Vitek v. Jones. There, a prisoner sued Nebraska after the State
involuntarily transferred him to a psychiatric hospital. "' A Nebraska
statute allowed such transfers upon a doctor's finding that the prisoner
suffered from a mental illness and could not be properly treated in
prison."° The Supreme Court held that the state statute granted the
prisoner a liberty interest guaranteeing some process before transfer."'
Rejecting Nebraska's argument that the prisoner had received all the
process he was due under state law, and thus the Constitution, the Court
explained that the Constitution, "not... legislative grace," confers due
process."' Invoking Morrissey, the Court held that the amount of process
due was a matter of federal law."2 The Court's holding that the state law
granted the prisoner a liberty interest did not upset the revived
right/privilege theory.
Perhaps sensing that a legislative act could wipe away its holding,
Vitek found in the Constitution itself another source of a liberty interest.
Contradicting the broad language (but not the holding) of Greenholtz,
the Court explained that a conviction did not fully extinguish a prisoner's
liberty."3 Relying on Morrissey's tripartite taxonomy, the Court
explained that even a duly convicted prisoner retains a residuum of
liberty to be free from involuntary psychiatric treatment unless
procedural protections precede such treatment."4 Although it laid out no
test to distinguish constitutional from state-created liberty interests, the
Court's concern about the nature and weight of the liberty informed this
classification. "' Focusing on the nature of the interest, the Court
explained that involuntary confinement in a psychiatric facility is
"qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered
io8. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 48o, 484 (1980).
io9. Id. at 483.
uo. Id. at 489-9o.
iii. Id. at 490 & n.6.
112. Id. at491.
113. Id. at 493-94.
114. See id,
115. Id. at 491-92.
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by a person convicted of crime."" 6 Turning to weight, the Court noted
that such confinement has a harsh impact on the confined individual. 7 It
also quoted with approval the district court's conclusion that the
confinement amounted to a grievous loss." 8 The Court located a historic
liberty interest in being free from "unjustified intrusions on personal
security.""I9 The stigmatizing consequences of the transfer to a psychiatric
facility for involuntary treatment and mandatory behavioral modification
therapy infringed liberty interests under the direct protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 20
B. SANDIN V. CONNER REVIVES MORRISSEY'S THEORY OF DUE PROCESS
Although Vitek did much to undermine the new right/privilege
binary, it did not announce a theoretical replacement. In 1995, Sandin v.
Conner'' took up that mantle. In Sandin, a prisoner who had been
segregated for misconduct, sued alleging insufficient procedural
protection.' The Supreme Court traced the history of prisoner due
process jurisprudence, noting that with the rise of the magical syntax
method, the focus on the grievous loss to the inmate waned.'23 Fed up
with the perverse incentives and trifling due process interests the magical
syntax theory engendered,'" the Court discarded it.' 5 Instead, the Court
announced a theory that focused exclusively on the nature and weight of
a state's incursion into a prisoner's liberty.' 6 This theory purports to
create three classifications of liberty interests. The Due Process Clause
itself protects prisoners against deprivations that exceed "the sentence in
[a sufficiently] unexpected manner.' 2 7 But interests that do not satisfy
this threshold may nonetheless find refuge in the Fourteenth
Amendment. A state creates a liberty interest when a deprivation
"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life. ' ' ,, 8 A less severe deprivation can
claim no protection from the Due Process Clause. Under this new
schema, the Court found no liberty interest in avoiding segregation from
ii6. Id. at 493.
117. Id. at 492 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-26 (I979)).
ti8. Id. at 492.
ii9. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. Id. at 494.
121. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
122. Id. at 475-76.
123. Id. at 48o.
124. For a discussion of these negative consequences, see supra text accompanying notes 99-1o6.
125. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483: accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394 (2oo5).
126. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. But see Herman, supra note 1, at 1255 (arguing that Sandin
showed little inclination to abandon the notion that states could create privileges).
127. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
128. Id.
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the general prison population.' 9
Turning history on its head, the Court presented the natural rights
theory of Morrissey in the clothing of the right/privilege binary. By
stating that "[s]tates may... create liberty interests,"' 3 the Court clung
to language suggesting that a government body creates an external
liberty interest. Yet, the tests the Court laid out to determine the source
of that liberty focus exclusively on the nature and the weight of its
deprivation. A state no longer has the power to avoid constitutional
protections for liberty by amending or interpreting mandatory language
in statutes. Instead, the nature and weight of the state incursion itself
serves as a source of due process protections, regardless of manipulation
by legislatures and courts.
In addition to revising Morrissey's weight-centered due process
analysis, the Court also covertly referred to Morrissey's tripartite
taxonomy. In order to avoid the appearance of disrupting precedent
from Wolff forward, the Court needed to maintain at least a nominal
difference between liberty interests that are protected "by the Due
Process Clause of its own force"' 3 ' and those created by the states.
However, distinguishing between state-created and constitutional
interests amounts to nothing more than a subtle reference to Morrissey's
tripartite taxonomy. Some deprivations, such as involuntary confinement
in a psychiatric facility, are so severe and unusual that it matters little
whether the individual has been convicted or paroled."' Here, the
tripartite taxonomy proves less useful. The Court labeled the liberty
interests in avoiding these deprivations constitutional. However, in other
cases the deprivation occupies an intermediate range of severity. In these
cases, whether the plaintiff has been convicted and whether he currently
resides in prison inform whether the deprivation is grievous enough to
require due process. In some instances, the prisoner has received all the
process required to deprive him of the liberty as a result of the
conviction.'33 In others, serious deprivations that do not normally
accompany prison life, such as revocation of good-time credit, merit
some protection under the Due Process Clause.'34 The Court labeled the
interest in avoiding these deprivations state-created.'33 But regardless of
the nominal classification as state-created or constitutional, the
Fourteenth Amendment now provides protection solely as a function of
129. Id. at 487.
130. Id. at 483-84.
131. Id. at 472.
132. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93 (i98o).
133. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1983).
134. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,556-57 (1974).
135. E.g. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489-9o ("This objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law ... gave
Jones a liberty interest." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the nature and weight of the deprivation. 136
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A COHERENT THEORY OF DUE PROCESS
The revival of the fundamental tenets of Morrissey has important
consequences for appellate courts. Although Sandin did away with the
theoretical foundation for state-created liberty interests, the Supreme
Court still describes some protected interests as state-created. This
discrepancy has caused considerable confusion in the circuit courts. Part
A describes various methods by which the Supreme Court can fully
reconcile Sandin with the natural rights theory of Morrissey. Part B
suggests a resolution of the contrary results reached by the circuit courts.
A. LOOSE ENDS IN THE SUPREME COURT
While the natural rights theory has resurfaced as a guiding force in
prisoner due process jurisprudence, its current right/privilege clothing
leaves a stray bit of yarn waiting to be pulled. The Supreme Court could
easily tie up this loose end without overruling prior cases in one of three
ways.
First, the Court could reserve the state-created language for those
cases where the state has no constitutional duty to provide a benefit, the
withdrawal of which the prisoner now challenges. This option comports
with the reason the Court first used the state-created language. States
"create" liberty interests in parole only in the sense that they legislate
parole schemes in the first place.'37 The same logic applies to good-time
credits. 13
However, a more recent case presents a surmountable obstacle to
the use of this option. In Wilkinson v. Austin, prisoners sued alleging
deprivation of due process before being transferred to a Supermax
prison.'39 Using conspicuously ambiguous language, the Court held that
the inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to the Supermax
136. But see Herman, supra note I, at 1256. Herman argues that the requirement that prisoners
show atypical and significant hardship constitutes little more than a new pleading requirement. Id.
However, Herman fails to see that the standard represents the interaction between Morrissey's
grievous loss requirement and its tripartite taxonomy. Cf. id. Herman argues that the word "atypical"
announces a new standard because Morrissey only focused on the weight. However, she provides no
explanation for why the atypicality of prison conditions that impose hardship does not in fact render
the loss more grievous. To the contrary, being singled out for harsh treatment different from what one
has been accustomed to in prison seems to logically render that treatment more grievous.
137. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693,710-I (1976).
138. See Wolff, 48 U.S. at 557.
139. 125 S. Ct. 2384. 2391 (2005). "Supermax facilities are maximum-security prisons with highly
restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison
population." Id. at 2388. In Ohio's Supermax prison, inmates had to remain in their 7 x 14 foot cells 23
hours per day. Id. at 2389. A light remains on in the cell at all times, and inmates are prevented from
communicating with each other. Id.
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prison because the transfer imposed an atypical and significant
hardship.'4" When laying out the legal standard, the Court referred to the
atypical and significant hardship standard as the "touchstone of the
inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest. ' ''4 '
This reference suggests that the liberty interest in avoiding a Supermax
prison arose from state law. However, if (i) the state-created designation
applies to only those liberties that arise from the withdrawal of a benefit
the state could constitutionally abolish, and (2) the interest in avoiding a
Supermax prison is a state-created liberty interest, the Constitution
would allow the states to hold every prisoner in a Supermax prison. The
Court has never so held, and one might imagine it would be reluctant to
do so. Nonetheless, because the majority never explicitly stated whether
this interest arose from the Constitution or was state-created, the
reference in the standard to a state-created liberty could be written off as
dicta.
Perhaps the most significant reason not to use the state-created
language to refer to state-provided benefits that are not mandated by the
Constitution is that it requires the Court to issue double holdings. Every
time the Court wishes to invoke the Morrissey tripartite taxonomy as a
factor that weighs against finding a liberty interest, the Court must also
hold that the state need not provide the benefit whose withdrawal the
plaintiff challenges. As the foregoing discussion of Wilkinson
demonstrates, whether the Constitution requires the state to provide the
"benefit" and whether due process attaches to the deprivation of that
benefit are two different questions that need not be linked.
As a second option, the Court could explain that the state-created
liberty interests only arise in the context of prisons, which are themselves
creatures of state law. The interests the Court has identified (explicitly or
implicitly) as arising solely out of state law include the liberty interests in
parole,'42 probation,'43 good-time credit,'" and avoiding transfer to
extremely high-security prisons.'45 The liberty interests that hail directly
from the Fourteenth Amendment include avoiding transfer to a
psychiatric facility 46 and involuntary administration of anti-psychotics.'47
The former interests all depend to some extent upon the context of a
prison. It makes little sense to ask whether someone who has not been
incarcerated has an interest in parole or good-time credit. On the other
140. Id. at 2395.
141. Id. at 2394.
142. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.
143. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
144. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,557 (i974).
145. See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2394.
146. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 445,493 (198o).
147. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (i99o).
June 2006
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
hand, the latter two interests apply outside the prison walls. Thus, the
Court could clarify that state-created interests are those that arise merely
because of the context of imprisonment. Although not necessarily
accurately portraying the roots of the state-created classification, this
explanation would be consistent with a test that focuses on the weight of
the interest in relation to the incidents of prison life.
Finally, over time, the Court could simply allow the common law
method to erase the state-created/constitutional binary. Neither of these
classifications is necessary to a theory of due process that focuses
exclusively on the weight. In fact, after Sandin, states have no power to
create liberty interests in any real sense. Whether a liberty interest exists
is now purely a matter of federal constitutional law. Even though a state
may be able to create a predicate for the exercise of that liberty (e.g.
offering parole to prisoners), once states have created that predicate,
they have no control over whether a liberty interest attaches. Simply
removing the language suggesting that states can create liberty interests
provides the most theoretically coherent standard of due process.
Furthermore, eliminating the state-created language would help reduce
significant confusion in the circuit courts." s The absence of an explicit
classification of the liberty interest in Wilkinson suggests that the Court
may already have embarked on this method.
B. CLEANUP IN THE LOWER COURTS
The revival of Morrissey has profound implications for decisions
issued by the courts of appeals. Lower courts, seemingly not sensing the
theoretical shift engendered by Sandin, persist in locating (or failing to
locate) state-created liberty interests by scouring state statutes 149 or
directly applying the right/privilege binary. 5' In order to fully align their
jurisprudence with Sandin, the courts of appeals should revisit three
categories of decisions that make use of the magical syntax method:
those that (i) incorrectly locate a liberty interest; (2) correctly locate a
liberty interest; and (3) incorrectly fail to locate a liberty interest. 5 '
i. Decisions that Incorrectly Locate a Liberty Interest
Sandin provided a compelling argument that courts should revisit
decisions that have located marginal liberty interests in state statutes. 152
148. See infra text accompanying notes 159-83.
149. E.g. Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69,81 (2d Cir. 2o00).
15o. See, e.g., Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2005).
151. One category, those that correctly fail to locate a liberty interest, does not merit extended
discussion. Obviously, a court of appeals need not revisit the holding of such a case. Although the
analysis used by that case has become outdated, courts can so advise the district courts by using the
other three cases. Courts may simply write off the analysis as dicta. See Sandin v. Conner, where the
Supreme Court used this method to reconcile its analysis with the holdings of Olim and Thompson.
515 U.S. 472, 483 n.5 (1995).
152. See id. at 483 (listing marginal cases). Because Sandin cogently presents this argument, I will
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First, these decisions fail to consider the requirement, dating at least
back to Morrissey, that prisoner claims must overcome a certain weight
threshold in order to state a cognizable liberty interest.'53 Second, the
Supreme Court has long shown a concern with reducing non-meritorious
prisoner actions, given that they consume so much of the federal
docket.'54 Now that Sandin has made nature and weight the pivotal focus
of whether a liberty interest exists, courts will need to revisit these
decisions to ensure that state resources are not spent providing due
process in advance of the withdrawal of less than weighty liberty
interests.
2. Decisions that Correctly Locate a Liberty Interest
After Sandin, courts of appeals have continued to locate state-
created liberty interests using the magical syntax method.'55 For instance,
courts continue to point to the language of statutes to conclude that state
law creates a liberty interest in release on parole., 6 The return to the
theoretical approach of Morrissey leaves no doubt that these decisions
are correct insofar as they find a liberty interest in parole. However,
insofar as their analysis continues to rely on state statutes, courts of
appeals should revisit them. While the holding of these cases will not
change, rectifying the theoretical basis is important to secure the
holdings in an intellectually coherent foundation and provide accurate
guidance for other actors in the penal system. Furthermore, bringing
these decisions in line with Sandin also removes the incentive for state
legislatures to reform their statutes ' and prevents lower courts from
holding that state supreme courts have interpreted the "right to parole"
out of existence.:
5
not belabor its repetition.
153. Id. at 480.
154. See id. at 482; accord Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (976).
155. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (parole); Tellier v. Fields, 280
F.3 d 69, 8i (2d Cir. 2000) (relocation to high-security cell); Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413,
1418 (D.C. Cir. t996) (parole); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29,32 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).
156. See supra note 146. Herman, without providing any analysis, argues that these decisions were
correctly decided. Herman, supra note 1, at 126o n.138. This argument is not persuasive. Sandin
criticized and discarded the magical syntax method. 515 U.S. at 482-83 & n.5. Furthermore, the Court
in Sandin cited to a parole case as an example of a state-created liberty that would be subject to the
atypical and significant hardship test. See id. at 483-84 (citing Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369
(1987)). If Sandin left any doubt, the Court in Wilkinson v. Austin erased it by reaffirming the
abrogation of the magical syntax method. 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394 (2005). The Court stated that
"[alithough Sandin abrogated Greenholtz's and Hewitt's methodology for establishing the liberty
interest, these cases remain instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level of procedural
safeguards." Id. at 2397. After the explicit abrogation of Greenholtz, little argument can be made that
the magical syntax method remains a useful tool in parole or probation cases.
157. For an example of this, see Ellis, 84 F.3d at 107-18 n.4.
158. For examples of courts concluding that the right to parole no longer exists, see Sass v. Cal. Bd.
of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982-83 (E.D. Cal. 2005), and Thomas v. Cal. Bd. of Prison
Terms, No. I:o5-CV-o955AWI LJO HC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27579, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 27,
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3. Decisions that Incorrectly Fail to Locate a Liberty Interest
After Sandin, other courts of appeals have relied on state statutes to
conclude that prisoners do not have certain liberty interests.'59 Among
the most well-reasoned (although wrongly decided) of these decisions is
Ellis v. District of Columbia. There, prisoners sued alleging violation of
their right to due process in advance of parole eligibility hearings.' 6o The
D.C. Circuit turned to the task of determining whether state law created
a liberty interest in release on parole.'6 ' After describing the magical
syntax method, the court candidly noted that Sandin rendered this
method uncertain.' 6' But, the court deemed Sandin's atypical and
significant hardship test "ill-fitted to parole eligibility determinations.' ' 63
If the test applied to parole, there would never be a liberty interest
because a loss of freedom from restraint is an ordinary incident of prison
life.'6 4 A prisoner does not gain freedom from restraint until release from
parole. The court believed that "[t]here is no room for an argument that
the denial of parole always imposes extraordinary hardship by extending
the length of incarceration" because Greenholtz had already rejected
that argument. 6' This line of reasoning convinced the court of appeals
that Greenholtz and Allen remained good law at least in cases alleging
insufficient procedural protections before a decision not to release a
prisoner on parole.' 66
For these reasons, the court looked to the language of District of
Columbia law to determine whether the prisoners had a liberty interest
in release on parole.' 67 Making use of the magical syntax method, the
court concluded that District of Columbia statutes did not create a liberty
interest in parole. 6' The court also held that that District of Columbia
regulations did not create a liberty interest.' 69 This holding relied on both
the language of the regulations, as well as a District of Columbia Court
of Appeals opinion interpreting them. [70
The decision in Ellis was wrongly decided. While the court
recognized that Sandin had abrogated a reliance on state law in due
2005).
159. See Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 1997) (right to decline antipsychotic
medication); Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1421 (parole).
16o. Ellis, 84 F.3d at 1414-15.
16i. Id. at 1415.
162. Id. at 1417.




r67. Id. at 1419-20.
I68. Id. at 1415.
169. Id. at 1420.
170. Id.
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process jurisprudence, it failed to recognize the deeper implications of
Sandin. Had the court seen Sandin as a return to a natural rights theory
of due process, it would have had no difficulty holding that denial of
parole "imposes extraordinary hardship by extending the length of
incarceration." 
7
Under Morrissey, a court would first ask whether denial of release
on parole imposed a grievous loss, taking into account the tripartite
taxonomy. 172 The restraints imposed by prison surely constitute a
grievous loss. Once released, the parolee "can be gainfully employed and
is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life."'
73
Unlike the parolees in Morrissey, the prisoner awaiting parole is
currently deprived of the liberty interest at stake. However, the Supreme
Court has already implicitly rejected the argument that the state's
present denial of a liberty interest to a prisoner renders the interest
unworthy of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court in
Sandin claimed to "return to the due process principles.., correctly
established and applied in Wolff.' 1 74 Wolff held that prisoners have a
liberty interest in good-time credits.' 75 Good-time credits represent
reductions in the term of imprisonment that inmates can earn for good
behavior in prison. 76 Usually, good-time is subtracted from the prisoner's
sentence when he is first incarcerated to generate an estimated release
date. 77 From the prisoner's point of view, misbehavior in prison
effectively "increases" the duration of incarceration.' However, a loss of
good-time credits does not actually increase the prisoner's sentence any
more than does denial of parole. In fact, good-time credits and release on
parole represent exactly the same liberty interest: a future possibility of
release before the expiration of a valid sentence. Thus, when Sandin
affirmed that prisoners have a liberty interest in retaining good-time
credits, it implicitly concluded that prisoners have a liberty interest in
release on parole.
It is true that the prisoner's conviction had provided process enough
to deprive him of a substantial amount of liberty."' However, the process
that led to conviction and sentencing only justifies deprivation in so far as
it results in imprisonment with a possibility of parole." Because a
171. Id. at 1418.
172. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481-82 (1972).
173. Id. at 482.
174. 515 U.S. 472, 483 (I995).
175. 418 U.S. 539,557 (1974).
176. Id. at 546 n.6.
177. ABADINSKY, supra note 26, at 223.
178. Id.
179. Cf Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (i98o).
i8o. Cf Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (995) ("This case does not present a dramatic
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prisoner awaiting parole is incarcerated, his loss does not reach the level
of severity inflicted by revocation of the parole of those who have
already left the confines of prison.' 8' While this discount to the
deprivation severity would cause the prisoner's interest to have less
weight in a Mathews balancing, it is not sufficient to deny any interest in
release on parole. 
8
,
The court in Ellis, understandably confused by the juxtaposition of
Sandin's weight-focused test with language of the right/privilege binary,
denied due process to prisoners awaiting parole. The court recognized
that if it were to apply the reasoning described above, the liberty interest
in release on parole would flow "directly from the Constitution without
regard to state law." '8 Considering itself bound by the state-created
language of Sandin, this seemed to be an impossible conclusion.
However, with the perspective of history, Sandin's return to a natural
rights theory ifiplies that, regardless of their labels, all due process
interests flow from the Constitution. Should the D.C. Circuit (or other
courts that have relied on the magical syntax method) wish to revisit
these decisions, the Supreme Court's explanation in Wilkinson of post-
Sandin due process theory' 84 provides a compelling justification.
Otherwise, the job of reconciling the circuit split between cases locating
and cases failing to locate a liberty interest at stake in the face of the
same government deprivation will fall to the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the claims of many observers,' 5 the recent revival of
Morrissey provides a coherent theory of due process that expands
protections for prisoners. The Supreme Court's requirement that liberty
interests satisfy a certain threshold of weight gives prisoners a reliable
and coherent interest in due process that is not subject to the political
pressures facing state legislatures. Furthermore, by focusing on weight,
the Court signals the Fourteenth Amendment's concern with the impact
on the prisoner. Perhaps most importantly, by locating the liberty
interest in this impact, as opposed to the vagaries of state law, the Court
can once again lay claim to a natural rights theory of liberty. Given that
departure from the basic conditions of [the prisoner's] indeterminate sentence.").
181. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482 & n.8 (1972).
182. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2397 (2005) (commenting that Greenholtz remains
instructive for the appropriate level of procedural safeguards, implying that prisoners have a liberty
interest in release on parole).
183. Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
184. See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2393-95.
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this theory provides the theoretical basis for our constitutional form of
government, the Court's return to Morrissey should be hailed as a
significant step forward in due process jurisprudence.
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